A Bias for Understanding: The Irregular Warfare Mindset in the Indo-Pacific
By Joe Tomczak, Lt Col, USAF
With more than two decades of counterinsurgency in the rear-view mirror and a renewed focus on deterring peer adversaries, articulating SOF’s role within the context of great-power competition is more important than ever. History has shown that strategic competition often manifests as brushfire conflicts, below the threshold of war, and in remote, austere locations. During the Cold War, this was where SOF thrived. In 2020, the Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy challenged the DoD to “embrace” and “make permanent the mindset” of irregular warfare—a task becoming more urgent as the collective memory and combat experience from 20 years of counterinsurgency exits the services. Given the attention on the “irregular warfare mindset,” what are its desirable attributes, and what contributions have Airmen made to these characteristics?
The parallel stories of two prominent Americans help further the discourse on the irregular warfare mindset. Two Airmen, Maj Gen Edward G. Lansdale and Lt Gen Donald C. Wurster, successfully navigated the intricacies of supporting a partner nation to achieve joint Filipino and American political objectives during two different eras in that country’s history. While Lansdale is better known for his controversial exploits in Vietnam, and Wurster is renowned for his time in command of AFSOC, the parallel stories of how these two officers employed irregular warfare strategies with remarkable symmetry present a compelling case study in special operations leadership. An examination of Lansdale and Wurster’s stories revealed five common traits: the ability to communicate a vision, build relationships, listen, question assumptions, and seek understanding before taking action. This article will explore those traits.
Then-Lt Col Edward Lansdale was a former marketing professional from California who set aside his career during World War II to work for the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). After the war, he was assigned to the Philippines as an Air Force intelligence officer. Between 1946 and 1953 Lansdale helped the government of the Republic of the Philippines suppress a revolt by a communist-aligned insurgent group during the Hukbalahap Insurrection. As the US navigated the first years of the Cold War, Lansdale led a small team of unconventional warfare (UW) specialists who advised Ramón Magsaysay, the Philippine Secretary of Defense. Together they developed and executed a counterinsurgency strategy to defeat the Huk leader, Luis Taruc. Lansdale built trust and consensus among stakeholders, sought out the enemy’s motivations, and prioritized the indirect application of military force.
A half-century later, then-Brig Gen Donald Wurster led Joint Task Force-510 (JTF-510) during the initial US effort to counter a violent extremist organization known as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) on the island of Basilan in the southern Philippines from 2001 to 2002. Wurster was a pragmatic helicopter pilot whose time in rescue and special operations units imbued him with a leadership style that valued trust, discipline, and communication based on mission-type orders. Wurster was commanding Special Operations Command Pacific in the summer of 2001 when three Americans were taken hostage by ASG. JTF-510 was established to provide personnel and resources to support the Philippines in a counterinsurgency effort against ASG. In the early, uncertain days of the Global War on Terror, while much of the world’s attention was on Afghanistan, Wurster and his JTF successfully developed a counterinsurgency strategy, managed an array of political and military stakeholders, and communicated his vision for a light-footprint approach while honoring the realities of local politics. JTF-510’s advise, train, and assist mission culminated in an operation to rescue the American hostages held by ASG and a separate direct action where Philippines forces eliminated the terrorist group’s leader, Abu Sabaya.