Introduction

The 1st Special Operations Wing’s heritage traces directly back to the famed 1st Air Commando Group during World War II. The 1st SOW’s heritage has the luxury of calling leaders like Cochran, Alison, and Aderholt, to name a few, their commanders. What Cochran and Alison did in the China Burma India (CBI) Theater and what Aderholt did in Korea and Southeast Asia was nothing short of amazing. These individuals coined and defined what it meant to be an Air Commando.

The 27th Special Operations Wing’s heritage is a little bit different. The 27th SOW traces back to the 27th Bombardment Group (BG) who deployed to the Philippines in November 1941 to deter Imperial Japanese aggression in the region. After the Japanese attacked the Philippines on 8 December and destroyed their aircraft on the ground, the Airmen of the 27th BG were soon converted to the 2nd Battalion, 1st Provisional Air Corps Regiment (Infantry). The first and only Air Corps and later, Air Force infantry unit. Despite having no formal infantry training, the regiment became a staunch fighting force of two battalions manned by Airmen from maintenance, ordnance, intelligence, ground staff, and aircrew. These brave Airmen held the left flank of the II Corps throughout the defense of Bataan, even escaping encirclement in the final battles, thus earning the moniker “The Steadfast Line.” Although their aircraft were destroyed, they acted with the moxie that defines what it means to be an Air Commando. The 27th BG serves as a lesson for all Air Commandos: Even if they destroy your aircraft, you can still give the enemy hell.

Caught on the Ground

On 8 December 1941 at 0230 hours, the U.S. Asiatic Fleet HQ received message traffic that the Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbor had been attacked by the Japanese Empire. The U.S. Commonwealth of the Philippines was 18 hours ahead of Hawaiian time and, therefore, nearly simultaneous to the attack on Pearl Harbor Japanese aircraft were enroute to the Philippines. The first strike force took off from Japanese light aircraft carrier Ryujo in the early morning hours of 8 December to strike targets on the island of Luzon. The U.S. forces in the Philippines only had hours’ notice that they were at war before they were attacked.

The Far East Air Force (FEAF), the largest concentration of American land-based air power outside the continental United States (CONUS), was commanded by General Lewis Brereton, who at 0500 hours, requested permission to launch his long-range bombers against Japanese bases on Formosa (modern day Taiwan). Unfortunately, General Douglas MacArthur was unavailable to approve a U.S. counterpunch. At 1230 hours, the Imperial Japanese air arm struck American air bases on Luzon in force, destroying the majority of the FEAF on the ground. This ultimately left MacArthur and his American-Filipino garrison without anything that resembled air power. As a result, the U.S. Asiatic Fleet, with its vintage WW1-era flush deck destroyers, was forced to rapidly withdraw to the Dutch East Indies and Australia. The only offensive arm of the Asiatic fleet MacArthur could count on for the foreseeable future were 29 submarines and a handful of plywood patrol torpedo (PT) boats to harass and complicate the Japanese supply and invasion routes. Unfortunately, for the U.S. forces left in the Philippines, the submariners and PT boat sailors would prove ineffective in stopping Japanese landings and logistics. With our Asiatic Fleet neutralized and Army Air Force grounded, the land echelon of the (United States Army Forces Far East) USAFFE was left to fend for themselves.

There were hundreds of Airmen who had contributed to the operation by flying planes, briefing intelligence, maintaining aircraft, or uploading munitions, no longer had a mission once their aircraft had been destroyed. Therefore, as the USAFFE divisions retreated to the Bataan Peninsula per the War Plan Orange (WPO) directive, these Airmen saw the opportunity in front of them to find a new way to bring the fight to the enemy.

A New Regiment

On the evening of 8-9 January 1942, the Provisional Air Corps Regiment (PACR) was established and began its field training while under attack from Japanese aircraft and artillery. Responsible for a section of the II Corps line running East to West across the Bataan Peninsula, the PACR would take responsibility for a 2,000-yard section of the line codenamed “subsection B”. For the first and only time in American military history, an Air Force unit would serve as frontline infantry formation. The PACR’s weapons were an ad hoc mixture of hand-me-down WW1 era rifles, grenades, and uniforms intermixed with salvaged machine guns from the wings of wrecked aircraft jerry-rigged into defensive fighting positions along their line.

The food situation on Bataan and within the PACR grew worse by the day with calorie-counts per day per man shrinking as the campaign dragged on with little to no resupply. Morale to hold out was strong when the Bataan defenders believed that the U.S. Navy would race across the Pacific to their rescue, relief, and reinforcement. These hopes would continuously be boasted by leadership, but slowly the men realized that help was not coming. They were coming to terms with the fact that their sacrifice would be what would compel the Allies to victory in the long run.

The dialogue from John Ford’s 1945 war-film They Were Expendable, starring Robert Montgomery and John Wayne, sums ups the situation well. An admiral from the Asiatic Fleet tells LT Brickley (Montgomery), Commander of Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron 3, of the situation in the Philippines:

[Admiral] That [Japanese]task force will land. You and I can’t stop it. Pearl Harbor was a disaster, like the Spanish Armada. Listen son, you and I are professionals. If the manager says sacrifice… we lay down a bunt and let somebody else hit the home runs. We heard all about those destroyers, out of commission, tied up around San Diego. We could use them here. But they’re not around. They won’t be. Our job is to lay down that sacrifice. That’s what we were trained for and that’s what we’ll do. Understand?
[Brickley] Yes sir…thank you.

Although a scene from a movie that was based on historical accounts of the operation, in a way, describes the Bataan spirit and the American grit that the men of the PACR and the rest of the defenders of Bataan and Corregidor displayed for those 5 months of holding out far longer than anyone could have expected.

Holding the Line

The PACR held the Bagac-Orion line within II Corps’ sector from 9 January 1942 until the Japanese broke through USAFFE’s lines in April. Throughout its frontline service, the PACR was advised by members of the regular U.S. 31st Infantry Regiment of the U.S. Philippine Division. This regular formation provided an advanced infantry training-like course in the field while PACR units were under air and artillery fire. Imperial Japanese Army Air Force (IJAAF) and Naval (IJN) dive bombers worked up and down the line bringing the former Airmen under constant air attack with little to no friendly opposition.

On the night of 6-7 April 1942, elements of the Imperial 4th Division and 65th Brigade broke through the front line and drove a wedge between I and II Corps. The PACR was under threat of encirclement to its left flank and fell back in a fighting retreat for three days. With no anti-tank weapons and under constant air and artillery assault, the PACR was fighting on its last legs with effort close to maximum. After months of fighting, disease, lack of ammunition, and starvation began to take its toll on the PACR and the garrison defending the Bataan Peninsula. The PACR, facing the Nagano Detachment and elements of the 8th Infantry and 7th Tank Regiments to its left, retreated alongside several Philippine Scout (U.S. Regular) regiments. The retreat began with several defensive lines being established at the Mamala River on the afternoon of 7 April. The Nagano Detachment and Imperial 8th Infantry and 7th Tank Regiments kept up the pressure and pushed the Americans south. After days of delaying actions at the Malama, Alangan, and Lamao Rivers, the PACR and other II Corps units held a final line on the night of 8-9 April guarding the North-South river crossing of Route 20 which led to the Luzon Force headquarters west of Cabcaben. By the morning of 9 April 1942, the situation was desperate and General King weighed his options. By the early hours of 9 April, two U.S. emissaries where dispatched forward with the white flag to meet the Japanese commander.

Ordered to Surrender

On 9 April 1942, General E.P. King Jr. surrendered the Bataan garrison without permission from higher headquarters and ordered all units on the peninsula to lay down their arms. After months of fighting and holding the line, when throughout the Pacific the Japanese seemed invincible, the band of Americans and Filipinos holding defiant on Bataan slowed the Imperial Army’s timetable of advance and forced the enemy to devote heavy resources to their destruction when they could have been committed to other vulnerable points throughout the Pacific. The men on Bataan and the garrison on Corregidor (which General Johnathan M. Wainwright surrendered on 6 May 1942) where promised humane treatment. This was a lie and tactical leadership of the Imperial Army treated the Allied POWs to the Emperor’s hospitality with the infamous Bataan Death March. The men of the PACR who survived the campaign on Bataan were then forced to endure years of imprisonment, torture, and horrific treatment. General Wainwright’s final transmission to President Roosevelt outlined the situation in the Philippines when he stated, “I have done all that could have been done to hold Bataan, but starved men without air support and with inadequate field artillery support cannot endure the terrific aerial and artillery bombardment that my troops were subjected to.”

Legacy and Conclusions for Today

Although this horrific chapter of American military history must remain honored, it is just as important to acknowledge and learn the history of the road to the Death March and the valor and courage of those who held “The Steadfast Line” on Bataan. The legacy of the PACR within the common knowledge of those who serve in our Air Force today must hold a place of priority. As tensions rise once again in the Pacific and our pacing threat(s) increases in capability, we must look to applied history and heritage of those who came before us to point the path forward. As Air Commandos, and specifically within the 27th SOW, we often forget our Pacific past and our own legacy that extends beyond Operations Thursday, Kingpin (Son Tay), and Eagle Claw. Although all three provide important lessons, Air Commandos, especially the new generation, would be wise to learn the lessons gleaned from all Airmen who did amazing things. Especially Airmen, dare I say Air Commandos in the case of the 27th BG, who had the “guts to try” when their situation looked darkest. Sometimes, in the case of Son Tay, we get the luxury to rehearse; other times we don’t. The men of the 27th Bombardment Group stepped up to the plate when the plan went to hell and executed with little to no training. To us, that’s the hallmark of being an Air Commando.

Inspiration for Air Commandos

Despite their shortcomings, the tenacious defenders of Bataan and Corregidor were able to significantly disrupt the timetable the Japanese had set for their conquest of the island nations for the Western Pacific. The Philippines campaign, originally scheduled to be completed in 50 days, took 5 months. Approximately 192,000 Japanese army and navy personnel had to be deployed, a number far in excess of the original strength allotment. We know now, with hindsight, that these early defensive actions fought so fiercely by the United States and its Allies in the Philippines bought valuable time for America to “gear up” for war, thereby contributing to the Allied victory. If these early Japanese campaigns had gone unchecked, the Allied offensive phase likely would have begun in Hawaii or California instead of New Guinea and Guadalcanal.

– Operation Plum by Adrian Martin and Larry Stephenson

What the men of the Steadfast Line did not know until after the war is that their selfless act bought time for America to gear up for war and it also enabled another group of Airmen to accomplish something outstanding. The Steadfast Line formally surrendered on 9 April 1942. The Bataan Death March lasted from 9-17 April. The Doolittle Raiders launched their strike on mainland Japan on 18 April 1942. The Bataan Death March and the fall of the Philippines was a demoralizing event for the United States which was still reeling from the attack on Pearl Harbor, but the Doolittle Raiders brought hope to the nation.

While the 27th BG was holding the line in the Philippines, the Raiders were training to takeoff from aircraft carriers within the Eglin range complex. The men of the 27th BG held the line for each other, but in doing so held the line for their fellow Airmen. The legacy and heritage of AFSOC, Hurlburt Field and Cannon AFB, the 1st and 27st SOWs are forever entwined. The Steadfast Line of the 27th Bombardment Group… Air Commandos by another name

About the Authors:

Lieutenant Grant Willis is an U.S. Air Force officer stationed at Cannon AFB, NM, and a Fellow with the Consortium of Indo-Pacific Researchers (CIPR). He is a distinguished graduate of the University of Cincinnati’s AFROTC program with a B.A. in International Affairs, with a minor in Political Science. He has multiple publications with the Consortium, United States Naval Institute’s (USNI) Proceedings Naval History Magazine, Air University’s Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs (JIPA), and Air University’s Wild Blue Yonder Journal. He is also a featured guest on multiple episodes of Vanguard: Indo-Pacific, the official podcast of the Consortium, USNI’s Proceedings Podcast, and CIPR conference panel lectures available on the Consortium’s YouTube channel.

Second Lieutenant Davey is a U.S. Air Force officer stationed at Cannon AFB, NM. He graduated Magna Cum Laude from Colorado State University with a B.A. in Journalism. Prior to commissioning as a Public Affairs Officer, he served for ten years as an Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technician in support of conventional and special operations forces globally. His work has been featured in Airman Magazine and Special Operation Command’s Tip of the Spear.

Major Riley Feeney is an U.S. Air Force officer stationed at Cannon AFB, NM. He is a distinguished graduate of the United States Air Force Academy with a B.A. in Economics, and a Masters in Applied Statistics from Colorado State University. He has been published in Air University’s Air & Space Operations Review’s Perspectives. He is also a featured in Business Insider.