During the planning of what was to become Operation Eagle Claw—the 24 April 1980 mission to rescue American hostages in Tehran Iran—a portion of the former Air Rescue and Recovery Service (ARRS) became involved. ARRS was headquartered at Scott AFB IL along side its parent command, Military Airlift Command (MAC, now Air Mobility Command). In 1978 the U.S. State Department asked for assistance in the recovery of deceased American citizens following the infamous Jonestown massacre in Guyana. ARRS relied on its HH-53B/C Super Jolly Green helicopters, which were used in Southeast Asia for combat rescue, infiltration, and extraction of friendly forces and casualties, for the operation. In May 1975, many of the same big Sikorsky helicopters supported our Marines during the SS Mayaguez incident in the Gulf of Siam at the end of the war. At the same time, the Rescue Service was working with the Air Force Systems Command at Wright-Patterson AFB OH to modify a handful of the HH-53s with equipment to allow the aircrews to operate at night and in adverse weather.

During the war in Southeast Asia courageous Airmen flew numerous dangerous combat rescue missions and suffered a fair amount of loses to enemy ground forces. The planners and crews believed they could mitigate some of the threat, if they could operate at night, but the navigation systems on the HH-53s were not precise enough to get the rescue crews to where the survivor was on the ground. Consequently, a combat mission need statement was developed and forwarded up the chain of command to justify modifying and upgrading the helicopters to be able to operate at night and adverse weather. The requirement was validated, and approved. The post-Vietnam DOD budget was shrinking, so in order to reduce the cost and get the program moving several navigation systems were borrowed from other active airframes. A moving map display was used from the A-7 attack aircraft and a low-level terrain following radar was sourced from from the F-111. These systems were integrated through an off-the-shelf mission computer with an early Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) system, an upgraded Inertial Navigation System, and other avionic upgrades, allowing the helicopter to get within a radius of 60 feet of the survivor.

The program managers at ARRS determined that the best place to test, evaluate, and train crews on the system was with the 1550th Aircrew Training & Test Wing (ATTW), initially at Hill AFB UT and moved to Kirtland AFB in Albuquerque NM in March 1976. The 1550th was responsible for the training of all Air Force helicopters (UH-1P/N, HH-3E and C/HH-53B/C), HC-130P/N rescue air fueling crew training, and the Air Force Pararescue School. Kirtland AFB shared the runways with the Albuquerque International Airport and the area was challenging because of the “mile-high” altitude above sea-level, but it was excellent for aircrew training because of the good weather and a balance of flat areas, rolling hills, cliffs, and mountains. The environment was also great for testing the newly integrated terrain-following/avoidance radar and other systems installed on the newly designated HH-53H Pave Low.

In the summer of 1979, Anastasia Somoza, the president of Nicaragua, was being driven from power and the American Embassy requested a deployment of rescue forces in the event a noncombatant evacuation order (NEO) was issued. The 39th Air Rescue and Recovery Wing, at Eglin AFB in northwest Florida was the closest operational unit and deployed several HH-53C’s to a U.S. Navy helicopter support carrier. Air refueling HC-130s and airlift C-130s were also deployed to Howard AB, Panama to support a possible NEO. The State Department and U.S. Embassy negotiated with the Rebel Junta and agreed that once the civilian airfield in Managua was closed down to commercial or contracted airlift, embassy employees and other U.S. citizens wishing to leave the country would be allowed to depart via the Montelimar Airport. As a result, after all the planning, the HH-53Cs were not needed. There was a second potential NEO in the same region in 1981 and the plans from Nicaragua were dusted off, studied, and updated.

From this time until the spring of 1980, the HH-53H office at the 1550th ATTW was growing and hard at work putting together training scenarios in anticipation of having the first Pave Low class come through the school. We created scenarios supporting various theater command areas of responsibility, and we used the local southwest area as fictional countries in the Pacific, Atlantic, Europe, Central and South America. The scenarios would be basically the same—retrieving downed airmen.

When the HH-53H Pave Low was conceived and designed, it was to be a combat rescue platform, so we assumed the aircraft’s mission was going to primarily support the European command in any conflict with the Soviet bloc countries. We were only getting nine aircraft and to split the force in more than one location was not considered logistically practical and support to NATO was the order of the day. That oder was to have a force available, specifically outfitted to fly at 100 feet off the deck in adverse, mountainous terrain, day or night, in order to recover downed Airmen in the event of hostilities in the European theater.

Early in 1980, five Airmen at the 1550th were brought into the peripheral planning for Operation Eagle Claw; these were the wing commander, his vice-wing commander, the deputy commander for operations, the chief tactics officer, and the intelligence NCO in the Pave Low office. Although we were never fully briefed on all the details of the mission (until we were packed and ready to go to support it), we were aware that something was brewing and we were going to have a part in it. At first there was some information flow, but then it just stopped.

At this time, the MAC Inspector General determined the 1550th ATTW was due an Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI).The IG had no idea what was being planned for the small Pave Low group and consequently went ahead with the inspection. While the inspection was underway, the Chairman, of the Joint Chiefs of staff through HQ MAC formally tasked the 1550th ATTW commander to send our three fully modified HH-53H Pave Lows to Dover AFB in Delaware and await further tasking. Soon after, on 23 April, two C-5A Galaxys landed in Albuquerque to pick up our helicopters. The Pave Low modified HH-53Hs had never been loaded on the C-5 and although we had the basic H-53 load plans, there was some concern that the helicopters would not fit the same due to the additional avionic modifications on the nose and antennae on the belly. These concerns were allayed, but it still took the maintainers the better part of 12 hours to get them loaded because main transmissions, rotor blades, external fuel tanks all had to be removed. Finally, the two C-5s, loaded the three helicopters, aircrews, maintenance team, and equipment departed Albuquerque on the 24th. No one was brought into the planning phase and none of the maintenance people were briefed. As far as they were concerned the movement was part of the inspection. We landed at Dover late in the evening and I was holding the package of maps, photos and other items higher headquarters thought we needed to accomplish the mission. During breakfast on the 25th we learned of the he aborted rescue attempt in the Iranian desert. Within 24 hours, we were back in Albuquerque and the helicopters were offloaded and put back together for training.

Our mission for the operation was going to be the rescue force staged at Manzariyeh, Iran where the Marines flying the RH-53Ds were going to bring the hostages and rescue force for movement to Egypt and eventually back to the U.S. Three HH-53H Pave Lows were added to the Eagle Claw plan very late in the process because the planners wanted to ensure two were available, but the delivery of the third modified HH-53H from Pensacola to Kirtland was delayed. Another wrinkle in the plan was the fact our Air Force HH-53Hs needed to be delivered to a location where the maintenance team could reassemble the birds, test them, and then fly them to Manzariyeh airfield, likely needing inflight refueling. This was all overcome by events, but, when tasked, we deployed to Dover AFB with all three HH-53Hs.

By the time we got back to Kirtland there was a tremendous amount of “Monday Morning Quarterbacking” as to why the Pave Lows were not considered for the mission versus the Navy RH-53Ds. First, they (Paves Lows) were not available when the planning started and HH-53Hs were not shipboard compatible (no folding rotor head). However, there were numerous Vietnam era HH-53C combat rescue and special operations pilots and crews available. I think that due to the amount of compartmentalization and concern for operational security (OPSEC), those with the knowledge just weren’t tapped. However, that wouldn’t last long.

With the failure of Desert One, President Carter created the Holloway Commission, made up of active and retired flag officers, to find out what went wrong with the plan and how to prevent another disaster from happening. The official unclassified findings concluded that too many restrictions in the name of secrecy were put on the planners, thus limiting them from actively researching other means of information than what was gathered by the Joint Task Force (JTF 1-79) staff. Another finding suggested that a Special Forces Command with the cooperation of all the services, be created to train, equip, plan, and execute operations as one force, instead of four separate entities coming together for a one time show of force. The thinking was obvious, train as you intend to fight (jointly), without parent service interference. Although the U.S. Special Operations Command was still 7 years from fruition, this is where the initial groundwork began. In the fall/winter of 1980 the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) was established at Fort Bragg, NC. All the services were instructed to be represented and staff the command accordingly.

However, months before the stand-up of JSOC, and just a few days after the disaster in the Iranian desert, President Carter directed his Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to begin planning another operation to rescue the American hostages in Tehran—the plan was code named Honey Badger. Major General Vaught, commander of the Eagle Claw operation, was asked to lead the second effort and Maj Gen Dick Secord, an Air Force officer steeped in the special operations business, was made his deputy.

One of the first orders of business was to move the sophisticated combat rescue HH-53H Pave Low helicopters from Kirtland to Hurlburt Field, FL, home of Tactical Air Command’s 1st Special Operations Wing. The wing at the time had only three flying squadrons, the 8th SOS (MC-130E Combat Talons, primary transport for the troops involved in Desert One), the 16th SOS (the AC-130H Spectre gunships that were scheduled to provide close air support for the rescue force in Tehran), and the 20th SOS, which flew UH-1N twin-engined Huey helicopters and CH-3E transport helicopters similar to the HH-3E Jolly Greens. At Duke Field, adjacent to Eglin AFB, the 919th Special Operation Squadron, an Air Force Reserve unit flew the older AC-130A model gunships. There was a deep sense of failure on the base and the loss of five local Airmen was felt by all. So to describe the scene at Hurlburt Field with the arrival of the rescue HH-53H Pave Lows as anything but confusing would be an understatement.

In 1980 Hurlburt Field’s base population was relatively small compared to today and all the aircrews knew one another. Additionally, Hurlburt Field was administered by Tactical Air Command (TAC). To reiterate, the HH-53H Pave Lows were assigned to the 1550th ATTW under MAC and were being modified for the combat rescue forces. The 20th SOS already had two different types of helicopter weapon systems assigned, when the HH-53Hs were transferred, but the aircrews qualified to fly them were still assigned to MAC as air rescue crews; none of the Pave Low aircrews or support personnel had been reassigned to TAC, yet. Consequently, the chain of command was not clearly defined and ARRS, having just lost the multi-million dollar Pave Low program, was not quite ready to lose all their experienced officers and NCOs, at the same time. Many had Vietnam experience with some of the same aircraft they were flying at the time, so a number of careers with ARRS/MAC were in jeopardy. Further, TAC was beginning to retire the aging F-4Es around the world and replacing them with F-15s and F-16s, and to find an avionics specialist, or an intelligence specialist with specific training in helicopter maintenance or low-level threat scenarios, was next to impossible. Nobody had planned these type missions since the war in Southeast Asia ended 5 years earlier.

Our first deployment in support of Honey Badger was to the southwest U.S. and a number of decisions needed to be made. Our air commander, a previous 20th SOS commander was directed to find out which personnel would stay with the Pave Lows in TAC and who wouldn’t. The easiest method of accomplishing this task was exactly what was done. In the operations area, three pieces of paper were put on the operations desk. It was mandatory for all personnel to come by the operations area at least once a day, to check in. Communication to our homes was very restricted and only allowed at the operations desk. The first paper was a hand-written note: If you won’t volunteer for assignment to Hurlburt Field, sign below. The second paper: If you are not a volunteer, but will take the assignment, sign below. Finally the third: If you volunteer for the assignment, sign below. It was as easy as that. Those who did not want reassignment remained on temporary duty until their positions were filled and there were enough personnel in the training pipeline to staff the remaining Pave Low billets.

While the aircrews were busy building their proficiency with the new Pave Low systems, we also had HH-53Cs from the 1550th, the 41st ARRS at McClellan AFB, and the 39th ARRS from Eglin flying with us, for a total of 16 H-53s. And while there were a lot of administrative issues to take care of between the MAJCOMs, the focus for all was to train for this next mission into Iran. The MC-130E Combat Talons and the AC-130H Spectres were also busy honing their skills and preparing to go back and rescue the American hostages.

At about the same time, a provisional Army helicopter unit, Task Force 158, was being organized at Ft Campbell KY. (Over the years the unit became officially known as the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment). Initially, the manpower and equipment was taken out of hide from the 101st Aviation Division and amazingly, not until 45 days into the flying training specifically for the rescue of the Iranian hostages did the Air Force become aware this unit was doing their own training with the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 75th Ranger Regiment. Elements of two Ranger Battalions were tasked to secure and hold the Iranian airfields as necessary to ensure the successful transload of the hostages to the aircraft that would fly them back to the States.

So, while all this new training was going on to incorporate the Pave Low helicopters into the plan, career officers and enlisted had to decide which way to go in regards to their assignment and careers. At about the same time Headquarters TAC decided that the 1st SOW needed new blood and brought back a previous squadron commander who was promoted to colonel to be the 1st SOW deputy commander for operations. The 20th SOS also got a new commander with H-53 helicopter experience. He came for Bergstrom AFB, TX and brought along one of his captains who was the only AF helicopter pilot to be on the Eagle Claw raid in April. Additionally, several of the Marine pilots from the first effort were available to us and we enjoyed a wealth of their information and planning they had accomplished for Desert One. There was a new sense of urgency and need that came with this assignment.
We were deployed from May until July 18th, and spent time in some of the most undesirable places in the western U.S.,and by the time we packed it up and headed for home the sense of what we could do in this mission kept us going, despite the living conditions.

The unit departed our operating location on the morning of 19 July, expecting to be at Hurlburt that night. Just outside Monticello, UT one of the HH-53s lost control and crashed. There were 10 people on board and sadly one of our maintenance Airman was killed on impact. The other nine people were able to get out of the wreckage, although the two pilots had severe back injuries and other broken bones. When the crash happened, all other aircraft returned to the accident area to assist and provide support for the injured. I was on the #2 aircraft of the lead element and for some reason we didn’t have any inter-plane communications, so when the #1 aircraft started a turn back, we knew something had happened. As we came around, we could see an enormous black stream of smoke rising from the ground and we knew it wasn’t going to be good news. Fate sometimes has a way of over-riding Murphy when you need help. The Monticello Emergency Medical Unit just happened to be holding a three-county conference on that very day and we had more ambulances respond to the accident than we had helicopters at the scene. It is very probable we could have lost more personnel if the EMS units had not been there to assist with the recovery.

The crash and injuries put another pall over the training and the obvious questions became evident again—is this a good idea?; are these the right aircraft?; are we training to hard? The intensity and the type of training was at an uncommon level and very stressful. Only a very few people were brought into the complete planning phase, primarily due to those three pieces of paper that were laid out in the operations office in Utah. No one really knew who was going to do what.

Following the crash and after the injured were cared for, we got back onto the helicopters and continued towards Kirtland AFB, where we decided to stay the night. Having started at Kirtland it was nice to be home, even though it was for only one night. Individuals from the other squadrons were put up in billeting and we mustered for an early morning departure for Hurlburt. We had 14 HH-53s when we left Albuquerque but we landed at Hurlburt Field with just 3. We had aborts all over the southwest and southern states. Wingmen went with their flight lead and the final emergency landing was in Mississippi on a sandbar in the middle of “Ole Big Muddy”. Most of the aborts were caused by a BIM (blade inspection method) caution light. The BIM gave the aircrew an indication that there might be a crack in a main rotor blade spar, which could lead to a catastrophic crash. This is the same situation that caused one of the helicopters on the Desert One raid to abort. The BIM, and later IBIS (inflight blade inspection system) caution lights, would cause a lot of discussion between the Air Force, Sikorsky (manufacturer of the H-53s) and special operations forces in the future.

Regarding the crash, the investigation determined that fuel was not transferring from the 650 gallon auxiliary fuel tanks into the main system properly and consequently, there was a severe fuel imbalance causing the pilot to lose control and crashed. It was truly a miracle that we lost only one soul—by the way the aircraft looked when we landed nearby, I was amazed anyone survived.

When we got back to Hurlburt Field there were a lot of changes on the horizon. The people who decided to stay with the Pave Low program were told to report back to their home units as soon as the next dress rehearsal was over and process out. We were told that leave would not be authorized and that we would not lose any leave days at the end of the fiscal year, but we did. The full-up rehearsal was replanned for the local area around Hurlburt Field because the region where we planned to practice was inundated by heavy rains and all our target areas were under water. When the training phase was complete, I went back to Kirtland, processed out, gathered the family, and set off to Florida.

After I got settled into Fort Walton Beach, the mission training resumed as if we never took a break. More and more training was being done with the Army’s TF-158 flying in different formations and scenarios learning to work as one unit, not separately. More and more training was centered on basically the same scenario, using slightly different assets. While the training was increased, several of the officers from Kirtland who stayed on trained the newer Pave Low pilots and got them up to speed concurrently. We also began to get gunners in from the munitions career field so with the two pilots and two flight engineers, the mission crew of the Pave Low became six. We also started flying close formations using night vision goggles (NVGs) and it got your attention at times. The NVGs were pretty heavy back then, so the pilots attached extra strength rubber bands or surgical tubing to the top of the goggles and to the upper panel in the cockpit and this helped keep the full weight of the NVGs off their necks. This seemed to work out pretty well as long as the flight engineer and the other pilot were off the goggles for safety reasons. We went out to the desert one more time during the fall and when we returned from this training Generals Vaught and Secord declared we were ready for the mission and reported back to the Pentagon that the special operation task force was standing by and ready to depart within 24 hours.

In November, the American people voted Ronald Reagan in as President and we received word from the incoming administration to put all further training (specifically for the hostages) on hold and to not execute the plan until after the inauguration. From late November until the inauguration on 20 January 1981, we continued to receive and analyze intelligence on the whereabouts of the hostages. We had strong indications that the hostages had been separated and were not all in the embassy area. With this new information, the absolute assurance that we could have rescued all the hostages in one effort became increasingly unrealistic.

By the time President Reagan was sworn in as the 40th President of the United States, an aircraft with all the embassy personnel on board was taking off from Tehran carrying them to freedom. Within 24 hours we were ordered to stand down the JTF and return to our normal duty locations.

This was the end of the Honey Badger period, but it was the beginning of a new era for the home of Air Force Special Operations at Hurlburt Field, FL. From the lessons learned during this training period (Pave Lows, Combat Talons, and Spectres), much of the future of the 1st SOW was molded from a typical hostage mission scenario. The exactness and precision of this training and planning bore fruit with the entire planning and execution of Operation Urgent Fury; accomplished in less than a week. Only from the framework of Honey Badger could the past, present, and hopefully the future of AFSOC be so expertly crafted. Operation Just Cause in Panama 1989 is a testament to the hard work throughout the 80’s. The MH-53J Pave Lows led the opening rounds of Operation Desert Storm, commonly called “The Kick-Off”, by doing what they had trained to do so much in the past—-be the path finders and be precise in leading others to the battle, successfully. The MH-53J/M Pave Lows and crews continued their distinguished service for nearly two decades after Desert Storm until all aircraft were retired from the Air Force by September 2008.

About the Author:

MSgt Paul Fremsted served as an active duty intelligence specialist as an Airman and government employee for 48 years. In his early career he supported the 5th Special Forces team in Vietnam and monitored activity at North Vietnamese POW camps prior to the famous Son Tay raid. He continued his career providing intelligence analysis and planning for Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada, for the HH-53H Pave Low combat rescue/special operations program, and augmented the 21st SOS for mission planning early in Operation Desert Storm, Upon retirement from active duty, he spent more than 20 years working as a government employee, providing signature management, operations security, and force protection plans training for our combat aviators. Paul Fremstad was inducted into the Air Commando Hall of Fame, Class of 2023.

[Editor’s note: For more information about Honey Badger see Roland Guidry’s article in Air Commando Journal Vol 3-4 online.]