On 17 Dec 1989, the 8th SOS learned that an operation in Panama was imminent. The squadron had just completed a series of demanding training exercises that culminated in a successful airfield seizure operation conducted at Choctaw Auxiliary Airfield just west of the Eglin AFB range complex. It was Sunday evening and most assigned personnel and their spouses were attending the annual 8th SOS Christmas party being held at Liollio’s restaurant in downtown Ft Walton Beach. Honored guests had begun to arrive, with about 150 people already at the restaurant, when the 1st SOW commander, Col George Gray, came in. An easygoing and likable professional, Gray showed no outward sign that something was brewing.

After greeting several members of the squadron, Gray found an opportune time to speak privately with the 8th SOS squadron commander, Col Jerry Thigpen, and confide in him the developing situation. Tensions had increased in Panama over the past several days and Manuel Noriega, the strongman who had controlled the country since the early 1980s, had declared war on the United States. Gray directed Thigpen to put together four crews and to place them in crew rest in anticipation of a noon Monday launch from Hurlburt Field. Not to arouse suspicion, Col Gray remained at the Christmas party through the dinner meal, but during the break at 2030, Thigpen made an announcement to the group. The squadron had just completed JRT 90-1 the previous Friday and Thigpen relayed to the guests that another iteration of the exercise had been scheduled for the following week. All 8th SOS assigned personnel were told to continue to enjoy the social event but to stop consuming alcohol by 2100. The party resumed, although somewhat subdued, with entertainment and other scheduled activities. Although nothing further was said about the unplanned tasking, spouses and squadron members alike (many of whom had been in special operations for most of their professional lives) sensed that something more than an exercise was imminent.

Earlier in the evening, Thigpen had talked with Col O’Reilly, his operations officer, and had directed him to quietly leave the party after dinner, proceed to the squadron, and put together four Combat Talon augmented crews. O’Reilly was to use the same crews that had participated in the recent JRT where possible. Some crew members, however, had departed on Saturday, 16 Dec, for Christmas leave and were not available. (The old adage that you never, ever go on leave while assigned to a special operations unit rang true again!) Thigpen remained at the party until 2230, when it began to break up and the attendees left for home. He went straight to the squadron operations center at Hurlburt Field, where O’Reilly had assembled a cadre of schedulers and aircrew personnel. With only minor adjustments, Thigpen approved the four crews and directed O’Reilly to put them in crew rest for a Monday morning (18 Dec) launch. With notifications made, everyone left for a brief night’s sleep. Before noon the next day, the largest air operation since the Vietnam War was under way and the 8th SOS Combat Talons were in the thick of it.

8th SOS Deploys to Lawson AAF, GA
The 1st SOW was a blur of activity by Monday morning, 18 Dec, when the 8th SOS crews were alerted and reported to the squadron. By 0900 there were five crews ready to brief in the 8th SOS squadron briefing room. (During the previous night the requirement for a fifth crew was added and the fifth crew was put in crew rest for the Monday morning show.) The 20th SOS, along with MH-47s from the Army’s 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, were in the process of deploying to Panama. The 9th SOS at Eglin AFB was tasked to refuel the helicopters and to provide SAR support over the Gulf of Mexico during the helicopter deployment. The 8th SOS was tasked to provide backup tanker support if the 9th SOS experienced an aircraft abort.

Two 8th SOS Talons were placed on alert for the backup helicopter refueling mission. Two MC-130Es, carrying the three Just Cause mission crews, departed for Lawson AAF, GA, at 1100 local. The 9th SOS successfully completed the helicopter refueling mission and the two alert Combat Talons were subsequently released to join the first two Combat Talons in Georgia. They departed Hurlburt Field and arrived at Lawson AAF during the late afternoon on 18 Dec. At 1500, a mass aircrew briefing was held at Ft Benning, GA, which was home to Lawson AAF and also the home of the 75th Ranger Regiment. The crews were given as much information as was available on the objective area and on possible threats to the aircraft. At the briefing the 8th SOS crews learned that their objective was Rio Hato Airfield and that their mission was to airland elements of Task Force Red Romeo utilizing NVG airland procedures.

With information in hand, the planners and crews sat down to put together the assault plan. An intelligence update and an in-progress review were scheduled for 2100 that evening, leaving no time to spare. Because most of the crew members from the 8th SOS had participated in the recently completed JRT 90-1, they were familiar with the task. Throughout the evening, additional special operations low-level (SOLL) C-130 crews arrived from Pope, Dyess, and Little Rock AFBs. These were conventional C-130s with crews trained to augment the Combat Talons. Most of the SOLL crews also had participated in the JRT.

At the 2100 briefing, there were 20 SOLL crews and 5 Combat Talon crews in attendance. A mission planner began the briefing by announcing that the President had signed the execute order for Operation Just Cause, which signified to all attendees that the mission was a go. The Rio Hato air assault force was divided into 2 packages—a 15-ship C-130 air-drop package that was scheduled to drop at H hour and a 5-ship NVG airland package that was made up of the 3 8th SOS Combat Talons and 2 Pope assigned C-130 SOLL aircraft. The airlanding was scheduled 35 minutes after the parachute assault. After the 2100 briefing, planners and crew members assigned to the 2 packages continued to refine their mission plans. The 5-ship airland package was ready to brief its mission by 0200 on 19 December. With some questions still not answered by planners during the briefing, the crews went into crew rest at 0300L.

Four MC-130Es and five Combat Talon crews had deployed to Lawson AAF for Operation Just Cause. After final mission planning, only three Combat Talons (plus a spare aircraft) and three augmented crews were required. Thigpen and O’Reilly had the difficult task of deciding the final makeup of the three mission crews. Because of the anticipated extended crew duty day for the mission (more than 24 hours), additional crew members were moved from Ted Korver’s crew to the three mission crews (See Figures 1-3). Korver later deployed to Howard AFB on 23 Dec to participate in follow-on operations in Panama. (Additional 8th SOS crews flew in Panama until 4 Jan 1990, when all hostilities ceased with the capture of Manuel Noriega and his delivery to the United States aboard Skip Davenport’s Combat Talon.)

While the 8th SOS crews were in crew rest, a cold front swept through Georgia and onward to the East Coast, bringing with it low clouds, rain, and near-freezing temperatures. At Pope AFB, where the XVIII Airborne Corps was scheduled to depart for its insertion into Panama, a severe ice storm threatened to cancel the launch. Weather, which had played a pivotal role in both Operation Eagle Claw and Operation Urgent Fury, was again giving the invasion force fits. At Lawson AAF the biggest problems faced by the force were the low clouds and generally miserable weather associated with the light, cold rain. The Combat Talon crews arrived at their aircraft at 1500 on the afternoon of 19 Dec. Through a scheduling glitch between Air Force and Army planners, the Ranger force had arrived hours earlier and was huddled behind the mission aircraft waiting for the aircrews. The troops were dressed for the hot, tropical environment of Panama and were chilled to the bone. The crew chiefs quickly opened the locked aircraft and started the gas turbine compressors so that the aircraft heaters could be operated. With the soldiers on board, the three aircraft were warmed up as maintenance and aircrew personnel initiated their preflight duties. By 1700 personnel and cargo were loaded and all were ready for launch.

The three Combat Talons were heavy. The first two aircraft had nearly identical loads—two US Army gun-jeeps and one USAF Special Tactics Squadron (STS) all-terrain vehicle (basically, a four-wheel-drive combat ambulance). In addition, there were 2 motorcycles, 4,000 pounds of Class A explosives, a forward-area-refueling-and-rearming-point (FARRP) system with 2 USAF fuels technicians, and 45 Rangers, plus the aircrew. T. J. Gallagher’s aircraft did not carry a special tactics vehicle, Class A explosives, or FARRP equipment, but was loaded to capacity with additional Rangers.

Each aircraft carried 58,000 pounds of fuel, with the first 2 Talons grossing out at approximately 180,000 pounds. The number 3 Combat Talon weighed slightly less. There were approximately 25 C-130s at Lawson AAF—15 primary C-130s for the air assault, three MC-130E Combat Talons and two SOLL C-130s for the NVG airlanding, and an assortment of spare aircraft should any primary aircraft abort during launch.

By 1730 the entire flight line was on the move. The proverbial “walk of the elephants” was under way, with the fully loaded C-130s maneuvering on a crowded ramp area into their takeoff positions. The Combat Talon crews had an excellent view of the spectacle, being parked on a side taxiway just 100 yds from the runway. At precisely 1802, Eastern Standard Time, the first C-130 began its takeoff roll, followed every 15 seconds by another aircraft. The weather had remained marginal throughout the afternoon and the ceiling was 300 feet overcast with one-mile visibility as the C-130s lifted off into the near darkness of the approaching night. One by one the aircraft disappeared into the overcast. Not one aircraft failed to make its scheduled departure time. By 1807L the C-130 formation had departed, leaving behind the engine running spare aircraft and the five-ship airland formation. There were only a few minutes left for the Talon crews to reflect on the night’s events before it was time for them to make their own departure.

Assault on Rio Hato AB
After a short taxi to the runway, Thigpen lined up the lead aircraft (64-0567) for its takeoff roll. At 1844L, the lead Combat Talon began to roll, with the other two Talons following at two-minute intervals at 1846L and 1848L. The two SOLL aircraft, which were not capable of in-flight refueling, and were lighter and faster than the Talons, followed the last Talon 15 minutes later at 1903L. As the heavy Combat Talons lifted into the now darkened night, they entered a solid overcast as they passed the departure end of the runway. The cold temperature helped create badly needed thrust for the turboprop engines, but the aircraft could climb only at about 300 feet per minute to a cruise ceiling of 14,000 feet. Eventually, as the aircraft burned off fuel, the formation continued its climb to 18,000 feet. After the two SOLL C-130s departed Lawson AAF, one experienced a maintenance problem and had to return to the airfield for repairs. Thanks to a superior maintenance effort, the problem was fixed and the aircraft was able to launch and to make its landing time at Rio Hato.

As the three Combat Talons flew south towards Panama, the early portion of the mission went according to plan. After passing the Yucatan Peninsula of Mexico, the three Talons were scheduled for an in-flight refueling (IFR) from two KC-135s at 10,000-feet altitude. At the air refueling control point, there were no tankers in sight. High overhead the Talon crews could see an armada of aircraft heading south on the same track as their formation, but none were slowing to refuel the MC-130Es. Eventually, one KC-135 rendezvoused with the Talon formation, and Davenport was first to receive his onload of fuel. With only one tanker, the three Talons could not take their preplanned fuel load. The crew navigators quickly calculated the minimum amount of fuel each Talon had to take to complete their primary airland mission, depart Rio Hato, and either land at Howard AB for additional fuel or refuel with another tanker en route back to Hurlburt Field. Gallagher was second on the boom, and he received his computed minimum fuel.

Thigpen was the last to hook up to the single tanker. He knew that his secondary mission, after airlanding his Rangers and STS personnel, was to set up a ground FARRP at Rio Hato to service helicopter gunships supporting the Ranger assault. Consequently, in coordination with his crew, he elected to onload all remaining fuel available from the tanker, which was about 5,000 pounds more than his planned on load. Thus, number two and number three Talons received slightly less than their planned on load while number one onloaded 5,000 pounds more fuel than was originally planned. If all went according to the pre-mission timetable, and the lead Talon landed at the scheduled time, the crew would have to dump excess fuel before landing to stop in the available runway. During the recent Blue Spoon JRT, however, the Ranger air-assault operation had taken more time than planned, and the follow-on airland mission was delayed until the runway was cleared. There was a good chance, the crew reasoned, that the formation would have to hold and wait for the “runway clear” call. The extra fuel would allow the lead Talon to hold for an additional hour and then still be able to deliver the planned fuel to the helicopter gunships.

The IFR operation was extremely challenging for the three Combat Talon crews, being in and out of the weather throughout the entire operation. Visual contact was lost several times between the formation aircraft, but the operation was successfully completed. Departing the tanker refueling track, the three Talons began their climb back to 18,000 feet and continued south. The two SOLL C-130s had closed slightly on the three Talons during the refueling operation. The number five aircraft, which had to return to Lawson AAF for repair, was still behind schedule but was catching up as the formation flew south. As the formation neared the northern coast of Panama, the 3 Talons began their descent to 500 feet above the water in the terrain-following mode. The 2 SOLL C-130s descended to approximately 1,000 feet above the water and flew modified contours once over land.

Coastal penetration was near Point Mauseto, Panama, with three low-level legs planned before the initial point for Rio Hato. From the time the formation descended to its low-level altitude, it was in and out of the weather until landing. When the lead Talon passed the Panamanian coastline, for some unknown reason, the ALE-40 flare system activated, and three defensive flares were launched from the aircraft. Any possibility of aircrew complacency was quickly forgotten, as the crew scrambled to determine the source of the flare activation. The crew could not determine why the three flares were expended, but there was little time to worry about it. The second turn point was rapidly approaching.

As the 3 Talons approached the second turn point at 500 feet, a C-141 formation passed overhead on a northerly heading out of Panama. They had air dropped Task Force Red Tango at Torrijos/Tocumen International Airport at H-hour. The large, blacked-out jets passed about 500 feet above the 3 blacked-out Combat Talons. The next critical decision point for the Rio Hato formation was the “runway clear” call, expected at 0130 as the lead aircraft approached the initial point for landing. No call was received, so the three Talons entered holding at that point. The lead Combat Talon held at 500 feet, number two climbed to 1,000 feet, and number three climbed to 1,500 feet. The two SOLL C-130s held at the pre-initial point at approximately 2,000 feet. Holding was flown in a fan pattern, with each aircraft passing over the holding point each time it made a complete circuit. The formation thus avoided flying the same ground track to minimize the possibility of drawing fire from hostile forces.

The three Talons were in the clouds for most of the holding pattern, which increased the risk to the formation of a midair collision or impact with the ground. They utilized their terrain-following radar to remain clear of the terrain and altitude separation to remain clear of each other. Each time one of the aircraft passed through the radar signals of one of the other two aircraft, the system would sound an alarm and direct an immediate fly up. With coordinated crew effort, the fly ups were systematically analyzed to make sure that there was not a clearance problem with the ground and were then overridden by the navigator. As the minutes passed, it became apparent that the lead Talon would need the additional fuel it had taken from the tanker a few hours earlier.

While the formation held short of Rio Hato, the crews monitored the progress of the action on the airfield by way of the aircraft’s radios. At H-hour two F-117A aircraft had each dropped a 2,000-pound bomb near the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) barracks southwest of the airfield. As the bombs fell, the C-130 formation that had departed Lawson AAF just before the Talons began its airdrop. Fifteen aircraft dropped personnel and equipment of Task Force Red Romeo and then escaped to the north upon completion of the airdrop. The PDF defenders were waiting for the formation, having been alerted 15 minutes earlier when the initial attack kicked off in Panama City. Several aircraft suffered battle damage during the drop and had to recover at Howard AB for combat repairs.

Along with the Rangers, STS personnel also parachuted into Rio Hato. Bernie Oder, the senior STS team member on the airfield, was responsible for relaying the all-important clearance to land for the Talon formation. He had become separated during the airdrop from his six-man team and from the Ranger Ground Force Commander. The PDF continued to put up a determined defense on the airfield as Oder made his way down the runway to the designated rendezvous point with the Ranger command element. Oder observed that the runway was blocked by two large trucks that had their tires deflated to make them more difficult to move. Once linked up with the ground force commander, Oder monitored the unfolding situation as the Rangers moved to secure the airfield. Because of the stubborn resistance by the PDF, it took the assault force approximately 90 minutes to clear the runway of obstructions.

Overhead, two AC-130 gunships from the 1st SOW were pounding PDF strongholds around the airfield. From Howard AB, a contingent of US Army AH-6 gunship helicopters deployed in direct support of the Rangers. As the battle unfolded, the helicopters began to run low on both fuel and ammunition. The FARRP equipment dropped by one of the C-130s could not be made operational, thus leaving the helicopters with no means of refueling. The FARRP equipment aboard the two Combat Talons became critical to the helicopter gunship operation. By 0215 the helicopters had begun to land on the beaches to the east of Rio Hato to await fuel and ammunition. By 0230 the Rangers had pushed the PDF off the main airfield and had removed the two vehicles from the runway. The airfield was ready for the five-ship airland formation.

Using the ABCCC aircraft as a relay, the radio operator on board the lead Combat Talon received Oder’s call clearing the formation to land. With clearance received, the lead Talon’s navigator quickly computed the aircraft’s landing time and passed it to the other four aircraft in the formation. The lead Talon’s landing time was established as 0253 local, with number two Talon landing at 0256 and number three at 0259. The remaining two SOLL-II C-130s would land 10 minutes after the last Combat Talon, with five minutes spacing between the aircraft. With the battle still intense around the perimeter of the airfield, the lead Talon departed holding inbound to Rio Hato.

Aircraft 64-0567 was the only SOF-I-modified aircraft of the 14 Combat Talons. Its navigational equipment was far superior to that found on the older, less-capable MOD-70 Talons. Thigpen had requested the aircraft to lead the formation specifically because of its improved accuracy and reliability. The extended holding period had degraded the MOD-70 navigation system on Davenport’s aircraft, but Thigpen’s system was “tight” and was performing at peak efficiency. As the aircraft neared the 4-mile point on final, tracers from the approach end of the runway were seen by the crew arching up into the dark sky. Knowing that he had the Rangers’ gun-jeeps and the critical FARRP system on board, Thigpen decided to continue the approach. Meanwhile, Davenport, in the number two Talon, was having problems with his MOD-70 navigation system and was approaching the airfield well to the west of his planned track. Gallagher, in Talon 64-0572, was still in holding and was maneuvering to begin his approach.

When the first Talon touched down on the 4,300-foot runway, it weighed 145,000 pounds, which was exactly its pre-mission computed landing weight. The SOF-I system had brought the aircraft down the middle of the runway perfectly aligned for landing (See Figure 1). As the aircraft slowed to taxi speed, Thigpen made a 180-degree turn on the runway and taxied back to the perpendicular taxiway located 2,000 feet down from the approach end. As the first Talon cleared the active, Davenport was maneuvering for his landing. The MOD-70 system had taken the aircraft to the west of Rio Hato. Scanning outside the aircraft with NVGs, the crew had realized the system error and had made a hard left turn, followed by a right turn to final for landing. With the number one Talon clear of the runway, Davenport landed and rolled out as planned. Meanwhile, Thigpen had off-loaded his gun-jeeps, the STS vehicle, and the Ranger force on the parallel taxiway, and had begun to back the aircraft 300 yards down the parallel taxiway to a point abeam the approach end of the runway. As Thigpen began his reverse-taxi maneuver, Davenport cleared the active runway on the perpendicular taxiway.

The number one aircraft had to stop his back-taxi maneuver on a call from his loadmaster, Brackett. There was a tree growing too close to the taxiway, blocking the aircraft’s path. Thigpen authorized Brackett to deplane and cut down the tree with the aircraft’s crash ax. Meanwhile, being unable to taxi to his planned offload position because of the position of the number one aircraft, Davenport’s loadmasters briefed their Ranger personnel of their new position, and off-loaded them on the perpendicular taxiway. As Davenport completed his off-load, Brackett had the tree cut down, and Thigpen continued his reverse taxi down the parallel. A second call to stop reverse taxiing came from Wilcox, the second loadmaster, and Thigpen again cleared Brackett out for a second time to chop down another tree. With the removal of the second tree, Thigpen was able to continue reverse taxiing to his preplanned FARRP location. While the first two aircraft were maneuvering to their final positions on the parallel taxiway, Gallagher landed at 0259, made a 180-degree turn on the runway, and taxied back to the approach end to download his assault force. Within five minutes of touchdown, Gallagher was again airborne in aircraft 64-0572 and headed back to Hurlburt Field.

Ten minutes after Gallagher departed, the first SOLL C-130E landed, made a 180-degree turn, and taxied back to the approach end of the runway. Once in position on the northern perpendicular taxiway, the aircraft off-loaded its personnel and cargo. The second SOLL aircraft was on short final when tracers appeared from west of the airfield. The crew initiated a low approach and went around. Once number five was clear of the runway, number four taxied into position and departed the airfield to the south. Approximately 10 minutes later, number five landed without further incident and taxied to the northern perpendicular taxiway. Once its personnel and cargo were offloaded, the SOLL C-130 reconfigured internally to a medevac configuration and remained in position ready to extract wounded personnel from the airfield.

At the southern end of the airfield, Davenport had reverse taxied down the parallel taxiway and had stopped in front of Thigpen’s Talon. He had an identical FARRP system onboard his aircraft and was prepared to carry out the FARRP tasking in the event Thigpen’s Talon was not able to do so. The lead Talon already had deployed a fuel hose and had set up a fuel pumping system that was connected to the aircraft’s single-point refueling manifold. All available crew members were cleared off headsets to assist the two Ranger munitions specialists in transporting the 180-pound rocket containers approximately 100 yards to the helicopter refueling and rearming point. As soon as the FARRP was operational (approximately 15 minutes), AH-6 helicopter gunships began arriving for fuel and ammo servicing. For the next two hours, aircraft 64-0567 remained in its position and serviced the AH-6 gunship helicopters. As the two Talons sat on the parallel taxiway, the battle between the Rangers and the PDF continued. While ground forces engaged the PDF, the two AC-130 gunships hammered away at the enemy’s defensive positions. Tracers filled the night sky as friendly forces moved to the west and to the south where most of the heavy concentration of PDF were located. At the north end of the airfield was the Pan American Highway, and just to the north of it sporadic firefights erupted.

After approximately one hour on the ground, Davenport reached “bingo” fuel status and prepared to maneuver for departure. Available photographs had not shown the full extent of the vegetation growing on the airfield. The photographs indicated that the taxiways were 60 feet wide, with cleared areas on each side well past the wingtips of the C-130 aircraft. In actuality, vegetation had grown past the edges of the taxiways, leaving only about 35 feet of clear asphalt down the center. On either side of the taxiways, “elephant grass” grew to a height of approximately eight feet, which totally obscured any obstacles that might be lying within the wingtips of the C-130. And airdrops earlier in the evening had left the tall grass covered with parachute canopies. With the PDF still waging stiff resistance to the west of the runway, Davenport called the STS for clearance to taxi up the eastern parallel taxiway en route to the northern end of the runway. From pre-mission study, the Talon should have had no problem with this taxi route.

Davenport was cleared to taxi, and he began to move north. Approximately 2,000 feet up the parallel, the right side of the aircraft suddenly began vibrating violently as the aircraft taxied between what was once an interior fence line. The number three engine was shut down as the Talon came to a stop, but the vibration persisted. The number four engine was then shut down and the vibration stopped. Davenport continued his taxi utilizing the number one and number two engines until he reached the northern perpendicular taxiway. Here, he deplaned a flight engineer and his loadmasters to look for possible damage to the number four propeller. Upon examination, one propeller blade was found to be bent, probably due to striking a hard object on the ground. The engine could not be restarted with the bent propeller tip. After consulting with his crew and conferring with the air component commander (Col George Gray) at Howard AB, Davenport was cleared to restart number three engine and make a three-engine NVG takeoff.

All but essential crew members were downloaded on the northern taxiway to reduce the number of personnel on the aircraft during the risky maneuver. Crew members who deplaned from Davenport’s aircraft moved south down the east taxiway and boarded the lead Talon, which was still conducting FARRP operations on the southern end of the airfield. Davenport was cleared onto the active runway, and he back-taxied north so that he could have as much runway available as possible for the three-engine takeoff. Of the original 8,000-foot-long runway, Davenport was able to use approximately 6,000 feet after his back-taxi maneuver. Skip Davenport, along with John O’Reilly as first pilot, Vinny Franco as navigator, Harvey Long as flight engineer, and Gary Crayne as loadmaster, successfully made the first-ever three-engine NVG takeoff under combat conditions in Talon history. (Davenport was later awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross for his heroism.) With only minor deviations, the aircraft performed as predicted, and the crew was airborne on its way to Howard AB. As the aircraft cleared the runway and struggled for altitude, tracers from PDF emplacements to the west of the runway were fired in its general direction. No rounds hit the aircraft, however, and the crew safely departed the area.

At the FARRP location, business was booming. The helicopters came and went as they needed fuel or ammo. They quickly expended their ordnance and returned to reload. About every third trip into the FARRP site, the helicopters topped off with fuel. As time passed, with all four engines running, the Combat Talon approached its bingo fuel level. For the aircraft to depart the airfield and make it to the tanker track north of Panama, the navigators had computed they required 14,000 pounds of fuel available. To go directly from Rio Hato to Howard AB required 8,000 pounds of fuel. The other determining factor for departure was the approaching daylight.

The entire airland operation had been completed in total blacked-out conditions. With daylight approaching the Combat Talon would be a sitting duck for PDF mortars that could be directed at it once the aircraft could be seen by the naked eye. With the helicopters needing fuel and rearming every few minutes, however, it was imperative that the FARRP be maintained as long as possible. As the Talon’s fuel decreased below 14,000 pounds, the navigators recomputed the fuel reserves and determined that 12,000 pounds out of Rio Hato would allow one try at the tanker then a divert back to Howard AB if fuel was not received. From the tanker track to Howard AB required 8,000 pounds of fuel to land with 4,000 pounds of fuel remaining. (In the C-130E aircraft, fuel gauges are not considered reliable with less than 1,000 pounds of fuel remaining in each of the four main fuel tanks. When the fuel gauges showed 4,000 pounds of fuel remaining, the crew had to assume that the tanks were empty. Therefore, all missions were planned to land with a minimum of 4,000 pounds of fuel remaining, plus required fuel reserves.)

With 13,000 pounds remaining and within 30 minutes of daylight, the FARRP operation was reluctantly discontinued and the aircraft was readied for takeoff. The heavy fuel hose was disconnected from the SPR manifold and left at the FARRP site along with additional ammo from Davenport’s Talon. With takeoff clearance received, Thigpen taxied north on the active runway and made a 180-degree turn. As Thigpen’s Talon lifted off approximately 2,000 feet down the runway, enemy tracers were seen off the nose of the aircraft. The crew transitioned immediately to the 250-foot terrain-following mode to minimize exposure to the small-arms threat. Within seconds, the Talon was out over the dark Pacific and away from enemy fire. The aircraft made a slow right turn en route to the northern coastline and tanker track.

There were 11,000 pounds of fuel remaining at that time. Before departing Rio Hato, Thigpen’s radio operator (Bonck) had coordinated IFR requirements with the ABCCC aircraft controlling air operations at Rio Hato. Thigpen was to refuel at 13,000 feet and onload 35,000 pounds of fuel, which was enough to fly nonstop to Hurlburt Field. As the Talon approached the tanker track, at least 10 fighter aircraft were on the same refueling frequency and also on Guard channel, and all were looking for a tanker. Ross had replaced Thigpen in the left seat of the Combat Talon, and Abbott was in the right seat. As the Talon continued north, the fuel gauges showed 10,000 pounds remaining. There was no tanker in sight and soon the aircraft would have to divert to Howard AB for fuel. Scanning outside the aircraft, the crew visually acquired a tanker below and slightly to the left of its track. The tanker was at approximately the same airspeed as the Combat Talon, but at about 6,000-feet altitude. The navigator made several calls on Guard channel after the tanker did not answer on the designated refueling frequency. Descending in an S turn, Ross maneuvered the Combat Talon to join with the tanker. As the Talon approached the KC-135 from the aft quadrant, it was visually apparent that the tanker was prepared to deliver fuel at 200 KIAS. In pre-contact another call was made on Guard, but the tanker still did not answer. Perhaps due to radio failure on the tanker aircraft, the two crews could not communicate with each other. The boom operator gave Ross a signal light to move forward, indicating that he was ready to refuel. Ross smoothly moved into the contact position and onloaded 35,000 pounds of fuel before disconnecting. Without any verbal contact with the tanker, the Talon crew had gotten its gas and was on its way back to Hurlburt Field.

The remainder of the flight home was uneventful, although everyone onboard was exhausted from the previous night’s operation. Upon landing at Hurlburt Field, Maj Gen Thomas Eggers and Brig Gen Jim Hobson met the aircraft as it parked in front of the 8th SOS operations building. It was 1000 local on 20 Dec 1989. Gallagher and his crew had landed hours before and had already departed the area for a much needed rest. Davenport and a portion of his crew were at Howard AB in crew rest with the aircraft undergoing a number four propeller change. The squadron had performed well during the operation and would be called upon again in the following days to support JSOTF operations in Panama.

In the days following the initial assault on Rio Hato, 8th SOS Combat Talons and their crews continued to support Operation Just Cause. The C-130 formation that had dropped Task Force Red Romeo had recovered at Howard AB. Many of the “slick” (non-AFSOC) C-130s had sustained battle damage during their airdrop and required repair. With the damaged propeller replaced on his Combat Talon, Davenport and his crew departed Howard AB on 20 Dec 2014. All 8th SOS Combat Talons were back at home station at that time.

About the Author: Col (Ret) Jerry Thigpen spent 31 years in special operations, flew over 1000 combat hours in SEA and later served as the commander of the 8 SOS and the 353rd SOG. He was a primary aircrew participant during the workup and execution of Operation Eagle Claw and participated in post-Desert One activities during Operation Honey Badger.  He authored the book “The Praetorian Starship: The Untold Story of the Combat Talon”.