On 22 May 1984, the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff signed a memorandum of agreement to use scarce resources efficiently by eliminating duplication of effort, resolving Service roles and missions, developing complementary systems, and giving priority to joint systems in their budgeting processes.

There were 31 Initiatives identified for immediate action covering air defense, air base defense, combat rescue, interdiction, reconnaissance, and intratheater airlift. #17 stated, “The Air Force will transfer the responsibility for providing rotary wing lift support for SOF to the Army.”

In the early days of Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), the only long range vertical lift platforms were provided by the Air Force. Initiative 17, which had been signed by the Army and the Air Force Chiefs of Staff in 1984, had agreed that all rotary-wing support for special operations forces (SOF) would be provided by the Army. At the time, however, the 160th SOAR did not have the technologically sophisticated, air-refuelable MH-60s and MH-47s that it has today. In order to meet the need for long-range insertion platforms, many AF Rescue aircraft were transferred to Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), including the HC-130 refuelers. In 1989 AFSOC was not a separate major command. All special operations and combat rescue aircraft fell under Twenty-third Air Force, under Military Airlift Command (MAC, now Air Mobility Command). AFSOC would formally activate as a major command in 1990, shortly after Operation JUST CAUSE.

The US intervention in the Republic of Panama in 1989 proved the wisdom of the much debated policy decision to move some of the active duty HC-130 tankers and one squadron of USAF MH-60 helicopters from Rescue to Special Operations. JUST CAUSE marked the first combat operations for the HC-130s following their transfer from Rescue. The action also justified many of the planned special operations capability improvements for AFSOC’s HC-130 fleet. I will share what I observed in the Rescue to SOF transition as a participating aviator and how JUST CAUSE helped that transition. I will focus on the 9th Special Operation Squadron and the HC-130, the aircraft I piloted.

I spent much of my Special Operations career in the 9 SOS as an instructor and evaluator pilot, and later was the operations officer and commander. I was a member of the squadron when it transitioned from the 55th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron (ARRS) under MAC to the 9th SOS under AFSOC. The SOF HC-130s dropped the “King” call sign used by Rescue forces in favor of “Combat Shadow.”

During my time in the squadron, I deployed on several exercises and combat operations, was always proud of the 9th SOS’s mission-hacking attitude, and most proud that the 9th SOS was the squadron of choice when helicopters needed air refueling—whether they were Air Force MH-53s or MH-60s, or US Army MH-47s or MH-60s from the 160th SOAR.

Prior to its transfer from Rescue to SOF, the 9th SOS maintained several specially qualified crews that habitually worked with SOF. This special qualification was known as Rescue-Special Operations Low Level (RSOLL). The RSOLL procedures had been developed during “HONEY BADGER,” the program to rapidly develop new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in the aftermath of the failed mission to rescue American hostages from Iran. The RSOLL crews were qualified to use night vision goggles (NVGs) during formation flying, low level flight, and helicopter air refueling.

The stories told of HONEY BADGER and the development of RSOLL procedures sounded more dangerous than actual combat to a young pilot. The original RSOLL crews talked about many close calls during training missions and the very spirited, and occasionally physical, debriefings that followed. Only the most seasoned HC-130 crewmembers were qualified in RSOLL procedures. Even very experienced crewmembers who transferred into the Rescue community had to wait several years before receiving the RSOLL qualification.

The RSOLL crews were an important part of the joint special operations package. The elements of this team frequently deployed together for joint readiness training exercises (JRT), usually testing several complex scenarios. The joint expeditionary force was ready to go anywhere, anytime, and many Department of Defense support agencies were well aware of the priority to be provided to any of their support requests. It was a source of pride to know we were part of that highly trained national team.

In the late 1980s, as the 160th SOAR began to receive refuelable helicopters, the numbers of helicopters needing air refueling increased. This, in turn, required all HC-130 crews to be NVG qualified. In addition to AFSOC’s HC-130s, several of the MC-130E Combat Talons were also capable of refueling helicopters, but their primary focus remained insertion, extraction, and resupply of SOF teams in denied areas. The Combat Talons could not devote the training time to the helicopter air refueling (HAR) mission set that the Combat Shadows could. Many of the Talons had their refueling pods removed for better performance and to remove wing loading restrictions during assault landings. The RSOLL crews were excellent providers of aerial refueling for large formation packages, but AFSOC needed many more crews trained to the RSOLL standard.

The RSOLL crews had developed procedures to fly HC-130s in close formation with NVGs, as well as procedures for NVG air refueling of large helicopter formations using communications-out procedures. Getting the RSOLL qualification was extremely difficult, and because of the squadron’s tradition of limiting qualification to those aviators who had a long history in Rescue, the RSOLL force remained limited. Even as the quality of NVGs improved the RSOLL brotherhood did not approve of new Rescue crewmembers wearing them. Moving the HC-130s from Rescue to SOF slowly helped to alleviate this problem.

The transition to special operations began with 39th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Wing, commanded by Col Jim Hobson, becoming the 39th Special Operations Wing (SOW). The 55th ARRS, which consisted of MH-60s and HC-130s would keep the MH-60s and be redesignated the 55th SOS and the HC-130s would form a new squadron, the 9th SOS. The 9th SOS had the only RSOLL-qualified crews and their HC-130s were uniquely modified with a Palletized Inertial Navigation System (PINS) and the ALR-69 and ALE-40 defensive systems to provide threat detection, and chaff and flares defensive measures. The HC-130 training squadron at Kirtland AFB did not have the PINS, so new 9th SOS navigators were training in-house on these systems as part of their long orientation program. In the years before Global Positioning System (GPS), navigation required superior chart reading as well as radar mapping skills. The PINS had a tendency to drift and had to be updated often. Because of this, the 9th SOS was the only HC-130 squadron with a second navigator on its crews.

Col Hobson required all his HC-130 crews to be NVG qualified, effectively ending the RSOLL special qualification. This was a difficult process since the HC-130 schoolhouse had no NVG training and all training had to be accomplished at the 9th SOS. Col Hobson insisted that all crews meet the new standard and pushed some personnel changes to make it happen. The RSOLL term was eliminated in favor of “NVG formation qualified”.

Operation BLUE SPOON was the code name during the planning for the Panama operation. Capt Fred Cowell and others did all the fuel planning for the 9-ship helicopter formation deployment from Eglin AFB and Hurlburt Field to Howard AFB, Panama. The deployment was very complex as the tankers’ “bingo” fuel at the end of the second and third refueling tracks left only a small amount each tanker could pass to the helicopters.

In the spring of 1989, Joint Task Force Panama was created with the XVIII Airborne Corps as the headquarters. Throughout the summer and fall, during Operation NIMROD DANCER, elements of the Rangers and the 160th SOAR were quietly inserted into Howard AFB. On 3 October Manuel Noriega foiled a coup attempt. On 15 December, Noriega declared that Panama was in a state of war with the United States.

On 16 December, several US servicemen were fired upon by the PDF at a roadblock and one officer was killed. A Navy lieutenant and his wife who had witnessed the event and were seized by the PDF and taken to La Comandancia for questioning. The Lieutenant was severely beaten and his wife was assaulted. These incidents forced President George Bush’s hand. The BLUE SPOON OPLAN was taken off the shelf and renamed Operation JUST CAUSE. On 17 December, the President gave the order to execute the OPLAN on 20 December. I remember thinking when we were alerted, that the movement of helicopters to Panama was only meant as a show of force.

The 9th SOS was enjoying the Christmas holidays and preparing for our squadron Christmas party on 20 December. Several crewmembers were on leave, but despite the holidays the 9th SOS had several crews on a 12-hour alert status. The helicopter deployment required almost the entire squadron so everyone was alerted and local leaves were cancelled. The squadron did not have enough airplanes on hand so the training squadron at Kirtland AFB ferried two additional HC-130s to Eglin.

The deployment began on 18 December, only 12 hours after alert. The 9th SOS was responsible for air refueling and overwater rescue support for five MH-53s, four MH-60s, and two MH-47s between Ft Walton Beach and Panama. The route took us around Cuba and low enough to avoid radar detection. The plan required three air refueling elements on each of the three refueling tracks. There were at least two spare tankers for each track. Each HC-130 formation had at least two aircraft with pararescuemen (PJs) and an RAMZ (air-droppable Zodiac inflatable boat). The first track was the easiest as the tankers could depart Eglin and still have plenty of fuel for the refueling. These tankers would return to base, refuel, and then fly back to refuel the helicopters on the last track.

The second track was more complex and each tanker took off at Emergency Wartime Weights. The Combat Shadows routinely flew with internal 1,800-gallon Benson tanks. The aircraft gross weights at takeoff were 175,000 pounds, with nearly half of that weight being fuel. The plan was to hit the refueling track at 155,000 pounds gross weight to avoid an aircraft stall condition during the refueling. A couple of the tankers had to dump fuel prior to refueling the helicopters, though.

Weather on the second track was also a factor and the crews were a mix of formation and non-formation qualified crews. One helicopter had to do a lost-wingman procedure about an hour before the second refueling and only got back into position a few minutes before starting on the air refueling (AR) track. The formation did an excellent job of staying together and positioning themselves for this critical air refueling. There was no good alternate if the refueling failed other than helicopters diverting into Mexico where we knew the aircraft and crews would be impounded by Mexican authorities and likely compromise the mission .

The third and last refueling was after dark so we used all the squadron’s NVG formation-qualified crews. Some crewmembers were not yet fully NVG qualified, but we solved this by putting instructors where needed.

Another problem we faced was fuel leaking from the Benson tanks. The normal configuration for HC-130s was one Benson tank installed. For this mission, though, a second Benson tank was installed to ensure we had sufficient gas for the helicopters and our Shadows. My aircraft developed a fuel leak, but knowing the fuel would be needed on the track, we worked it while airborne instead of returning for maintenance. The two PJs on board helped the crew chief tape up the leaks with aircraft tape and medical tape.

The NVG join-up for the last AR track was uneventful because we found a clear spot in the weather. The clear weather did not last, though, and with helicopters in tow we had to maneuver around clouds. This would not have been possible without the NVGs. Things got more complex when the third element of tankers hit bingo before passing all the needed fuel to the helicopters. The second element’s spare tanker maneuvered to a position in the third element. After completing the refueling with the third element, the spare then had to return to the second element to complete the second element’s refueling.

All these changes in aircraft positioning were occurring in bad weather with intermittent radio contact. The helicopter mission commander was getting frustrated because he was not hearing the entire request and was relieved when the second element was refueled. We were just about to depart the track when a first element helicopter requested additional fuel. The only spare that had fuel to pass was in the second element and had to catch up to the first element in order to pass the required gas. Finally, with all air refuelings complete, all tankers joined in close trail for Howard AFB.

The five ship formation of Combat Shadows was now on its way to Howard AFB and I found myself in the lead. The formation order was based on where we were after the last AR and since I was the spare that moved all the way to the front during the last AR, that made me the lead. Our plan was for a high speed downwind to Howard.

Once we contacted the tower we were directed to a downwind 500 foot higher than our normal pattern altitude. I extended my break, but after roll out my first thought was, “Oh I’m too steep. I hope my wingman can adjust … it’s been a long night.” As formation lead you want to land on the first few feet of the runway to give your wingman less dirty air, so I throttled back the max possible to hit the first few hundred feet of pavement. I was surprised no one commented on my bad downwind during the mission debrief. During the debrief we were told that Lt Col Art Jistel (9th SOS commander) had selected my aircraft and crew and Capt Lenny Smale’s aircraft and crew to remain in Panama to support further operations.

The crews with our crew chiefs that were staying in Panama refueled and configured their aircraft for a quick launch. We then reported to Lt Col Jistel for an arrival brief. Walking to the hanger where we were to be briefed for the first time I realized this is no exercise or show of force. The hanger was filled with SEALS, Special Forces, and 160th SOAR Little Birds.

After a quick debrief we were instructed to return to the hanger at 1000 the next morning. It was already past midnight, but there were no complaints about crew rest. Both crews were to be billeted in a vacant house in the base housing area and we were issued cots and blankets.

The morning came quick and all were ready to get to the brief and prepare the aircraft. The officers and radio operator went to the mission brief and the loadmaster and engineers worked with maintenance to ensure the aircraft were ready for combat. The Combat Shadows’ mission was focused on helicopter air refueling and rescue support. Each aircraft had two PJs and a RAMZ ready for deployment.

We sat on the ramp in our seats as the combat phase began. The SATCOM (satellite communications radio) was busy with all the activity as we tracked events being accomplished on the execution checklist. The gunships were raising havoc at La Comandancia, the hostage rescue at Modelo prison was going well, airdrops were happening, and all seemed well until the word came that SEALs had been ambushed at a hanger at the Paitilla Airfield. The MH-60s launched to support with guns and medical evacuation.

While we sat near the end of the runway, we heard that the C-130s that dropped Rangers into Rio Hato were inbound for landing. We also heard that gunships were taking out AAA during the airdrop, but also heard the formation was taking some hits. The formation stayed together through the AAA and made a successful airdrop. I was proudly thinking that part of the airdrop formation was my old squadron from Little Rock AFB, the “Red Devils” of the 50th Tactical Airlift Squadron.

We heard that aircraft number three in the formation had to shut down one of his engines and another had a badly wounded member on board. The lead C-130 asked if the damaged plane wanted to break out of the formation. As there were airplanes and helicopters all over the sky, the damaged aircraft pilot’s response was, “No, I want to get this formation down as soon as possible and it would be best for all aircraft to land together without delay.” After the formation landed we understood why he decided to not disrupt the formation—his aircraft was not the only aircraft that had received combat damage.

The C-130s were now taxiing on the taxiway directly next to where we were parked. We saw the fuel running out of the wings of more than one of the aircraft and one was especially bad. We all hoped that they would keep moving without delay, but the ramp was congested and sure enough the worst leaking C-130 stopped right beside us. As the fuel puddle expanded under the C-130’s wing, it appeared to be flowing toward us. My loadmaster, MSgt Matt King departed our aircraft and manned a fire bottle between us and the expanding puddle of fuel. His plan was to delay the fuel if it came too close and give our aircraft a chance to get away if the fuel ignited.

As Matt was doing “fire control,” our PJs, John Smith and Don Shelton, went to the nearby casualty collection point (CCP) and treated Rangers from Rio Hato and a number of injuries from the Torrijos-Tocumen International Airport airdrop, as well as SEALs from Paitilla Airfield. They later flew into Rio Hato and augmented PJs that had been airdropped or airlanded at H-hour. They remained at Rio Hato well into the afternoon of the next day, then returned via an MH-53 assisting casualties onboard. They remained in the PJ pool for future tasking after their return from Rio Hato. The RAMZ stayed on board our aircraft in case they were needed and the PJs were retasked to us.

We were very relieved when the C-130 formation continued the taxi to the opposite side of the runway. I heard later about the heroic actions of the Little Rock maintenance crews getting soaked by JP-4 as they applied battle damage repairs to those C-130s’ wings. The damaged airplanes needed to return to the US since Howard had so little ramp space. The efforts of C-130 maintainers from all the SOF and MAC units at Howard resulted in all but one of the C-130 formation being able to depart that night.

New helicopter taskings happened quickly now. The MH-60s were supporting the compromised SEAL mission. One MH-53 was tasked to give chase to a suspicious helicopter crossing Panama. Some weather was forming and because of the MH-53s’ sophisticated navigation systems they were now moving troops and supplies, conducting medical evacuations, and providing fire support for several events. Both HC-130 crews launched and moved to tracks that we felt were most likely needed. We maintained contact with each other and tried to ensure that when the helicopters needed gas at least one of us would be in the air. We would pass fuel and then do a max speed return to Howard for an overhead landing, refuel, and re-launch as quickly as possible.

On one return to Howard, I was maneuvering the aircraft for an overhead at over 200 knots when my copilot, Capt Hank Sanders noted that we were flying near a cloud. Then I heard, “Oh s—t, that’s not a cloud, it’s an airplane!” It was in fact a fully blacked out C-5 on final. He was descending to the runway when we turned underneath him. I pushed down and away and made a 360 turn to sequence behind him. I don’t believe the C-5 crew ever saw us.

We finally landed the next morning and got back to the room for a little crew rest. We kept the aircraft forms open and the aircraft ready for an immediate launch. We barely had a nap when we were called back to launch the aircraft because of a threat to aircraft at Howard. We launched to provide AR support to the helicopters. Once we landed we again moved back to the quarters only to be recalled again. Noriega was on the run. The helicopters were now tasked to support surrender negotiating teams, small PDF containment missions, and troop movement and logistical support, along with supporting the search for Noriega.

On one occasion after being launched for AR support, we heard an Army MH-60 make an emergency landing because of fuel. They were waiting for the “Fat Cow,” an MH-47 with extra tanks for ground refueling. They reported a large crowd walking down the hill toward their helicopter and did not know if they were friendly or a threat. We were close by and after confirming their location, we flew our tanker in an AC-130 gunship pattern overhead. White flags came out immediately, so I guess the population had heard about the gunship actions over La Comandancia.

After four days, more Combat Shadow crews arrived and we moved from combat operations to security operations. Manuel Noriega was captured in early January 1990 and Operation JUST CAUSE ended on 31 January. Security and reconstruction operations began and the HC-130s remained in Panama for several weeks.

Operation JUST CAUSE was a great initiation for the 9th SOS and the Combat Shadows into SOF. Because of what we learned during JUST CAUSE, AFSOC’s HC-130s were modified with the Special Operations Forces Improvements. These included better countermeasures and a forward looking infrared. Many of the Shadows were modified to receive gas from a KC-135 or KC-10. The 9th SOS also received more aircraft and crews.

Since Operation JUST CAUSE, the Combat Shadows have proven themselves in every conflict. Combat Shadow crews have taken pride in being the tanker of choice for SOF vertical lift. In addition to helicopter air refueling, Combat Shadows have also contributed to SOF combat operations with NVG airland and airdrop capabilities to insert, extract, and resupply special operations teams around the world. As AFSOC’s C-130 fleet is recapitalized with the new MC-130Js, it is worthwhile to look back and reflect on the outstanding history of the HC-130’s transition to AFSOC and the superb contributions of the Combat Shadow community.

About the Author: Joe Tyner, Col, USAF (Ret) was a career Air Commando and former Commander of the 9th SOS and Dep Commander of the 16th Operations Group. He had multiple combat deployments with over 6000 hours flying time of which over 3000 were in the Combat Shadow.

Contributing author Lewis E. ‘Jordie’ Jordan Jr., Col, USAF (Ret) began his career as a navigator in HC-130s.  Served as Commander of the 17th SOS, the 352 SOG and CJSOAC. His last assignment was Dep A5/8 at AFSOC Headquarters.